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WATER

RIGHTS

What Are the Respective Rights
of Virginia and Maryland in Relation
to the Potomac River?
by Robert H. Abrams
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 10-13. © 2003 American Bar Association.

in past cases have not resulted in
acquiescence by Virginia to
Maryland sovereignty over the
waters of the Potomac River beyond
the low-water mark on the Virginia
side of the river?

Robert H. Abrams is a professor
of law at Wayne State University
Law School. He is co-author of a
text on water law and a former
chairperson of the American Bar
Association Water Resources
Committee. He can be reached
by phone at (313) 577-3935 or via
e-mail at rabrams@wayne.edu.

FACTS
This case has two sets of facts, one
recent and one steeped in the history of the colonial period and the
founding of the American nation.
The recent facts can be set forth
succinctly; the historical facts are
considerably more voluminous, but
also fairly easily stated.

Through a centuries-old quirk of
history, the state boundary between
Virginia and Maryland runs along
the low-water mark on the Virginia
side of the Potomac River. As part of
a water-supply project, Virginia
sought in 1996 to build a waterintake facility on the Virginia shore
with pipes extending into Maryland's
portion of the river. Maryland insists
that its regulatory approval is
required, whereas Virginia insists
that the historical agreements
that fixed the interstate boundary
did not cede to Maryland any regulatory authority over Virginia's use
of the river.

Fairfax County, Virginia, in a
response to its growing population,
sought to increase its water supply
by building an additional waterintake structure on the Virginia
shore of the Potomac River at a
point where that river forms the
boundary between Maryland on the
north and Virginia on the south.
The project would serve approximately 1.2 million people in north-

ISSUES
Did the Special Master err in finding
that the Compact of 1785 and the
Black-Jenkins Award of 1877 did
not create regulatory jurisdiction
in favor of Maryland over Virginia
water projects that extend into the
Maryland waters of the Potomac
River?

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA V.
STATE OF MARYLAND

Docket No. 129 Original
Argument Date:
October 7, 2003
From: The Report of the
Special Master, sitting by designation of the United States
Supreme Court

Did the Special Master err in finding
that actions by Virginia submitting
to Maryland regulatory procedures
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ern Virginia. The water intake was
planned to extend 725 feet into the
river, a distance that, through a
quirk in history, placed its terminus
beyond the state line into the
Maryland portion of the river. On
January 4, 1996, the Fairfax County
Water Authority sought approval
from Maryland state agencies for
permits that would allow it to
construct the portions of the
water-intake project that would
be submerged in Maryland portions
of the river.
Eventually, after four years of little
progress, Maryland issued a preliminary denial of the permit to construct the facility. Virginia thereupon initiated this litigation, invoking the original jurisdiction of the
United States Supreme Court over
disputes between two or more of the
states. The case was assigned to
Ralph Lancaster of Portland, Maine,
to serve as Special Master.
Although the requested permit was
eventually issued by Maryland
authorities, three of Virginia's four
claims for relief were of a more
generic nature, contesting, in
essence, how much control, if any,
Maryland may exercise over Virginia
water projects in the Potomac River.
In late 2002, the Master delivered
his report that, in almost every
regard, ruled in favor of Virginia.
The case is now before the Supreme
Court to review the "exceptions" of
each of the parties to the Special
Master's report. In fact, the "exceptions" being taken are entirely those
of Maryland, while Virginia seeks to
have the report accepted.
The historical facts begin in the
colonial period of American history
when both Virginia and Maryland
were created by charters issued by
several of the English monarchs,
beginning as early as 1606 and King
James I and stretching up to 1688
and King James II. Importantly, in

1609, James I gave, and in 1688,
James II confirmed, grants to
Virginia of its "Northern Neck" that
included lands north of the Potomac
and all of the Potomac River itself.
Even so, Charles I, in 1632, granted
to Maryland the Potomac River from
shore to shore. Thus, with conflicting charters in place, the groundwork was set for several subsequent
centuries of disputes between
Virginia and Maryland.
The pivotal actions that set the
stage for resolving the conflicting
claims of Virginia and Maryland
occurred late in the eighteenth century when the United States was
formed. In its state constitution
adopted in 1776, Virginia ceded its
conflicting charter claims to the
lands and waters to Maryland and
three of the other original states.
Virginia's 1776 constitution, however, excepted from the cession "the
free navigation and use of the rivers
Potowmack and Pokomoke, with the
property of the Virginia shores or
strands bordering on either of the
said rivers, and all improvements
which have been or shall be made
thereon." Later in 1776, Maryland
ratified its own constitution, rejecting the Virginia exception by claiming sole and exclusive jurisdiction
over "the river Potowmack." Thus, a
slightly more sophisticated groundwork for further disputes was now
in place.
As soon as 1777, jurisdictional disputes arose between Virginia and
Maryland. In 1785, following the
conclusion of the Revolutionary War
but before the ratification of the
United States Constitution, those
two states entered into an interstate
compact. Article 7 of this compact
granted exclusive rights to each
state in the lands on their respective shores, and common rights of
fishing and navigation, but did not
resolve with specificity the competing claims to the river and territori-

al jurisdiction beyond the shores.
There was common purpose uniting
the states: the desire to improve
upstream navigation. With the compact in place, whatever disputes
arose were susceptible of settlement
or of being ignored for a bit less
than a century.
The absence of a precisely defined
and agreed border between Virginia
and Maryland came to the fore again
following the Civil War. Seeking resolution of the "true line of boundary," the states submitted the matter to binding arbitration. In 1877,
in a decision named for two of the
three arbitrators, the "Black-Jenkins
Award" fixed the state boundary at
the low-water mark on the Virginia
side of the river, thereby giving
Maryland the vast majority of the
river. The award relied heavily on
the language of the Charter of 1632
from James I to Lord Baltimore that
specifically granted to Lord
Baltimore and Maryland the river to
the south (Virginia) bank.
Additionally, however, the arbitrators found that Virginia had
retained the use of the river beyond
the low-water mark. This finding
relied on the ambiguities in the
charters and in the Compact of
1785, buttressed by the long, continued use of those waters by
Virginia (legally known as the doctrine of prescription). Both states
ratified the award in 1878 and
Congress consented a year later.
The Black-Jenkins Award expressly
recognized sovereignty rights in
both states that can be in opposition
to each other. Maryland's sovereignty over the portion of the river
eventually awarded to it by BlackJenkins seemingly includes regulatory jurisdiction sufficient to deny a
permit to the Fairfax County Water
Authority to place an intake in
Maryland waters. Virginia's sovereignty that was explicitly recognized
in Black-Jenkins, however. included
(Continued on Page 12)
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"a right to such use of the river
beyond the line of low-water
mark as may be necessary to the
full enjoyment of her riparian
ownership .... "
In the next 120 years, with the
boundary well settled, the states
exercised sovereignty with reference
to that line of demarcation. In particular, Maryland exercised the full
range of state authority over all
aspects of activities that occurred
north of the low-water mark on the
Virginia side of the Potomac.
Correlatively, Virginia, though continuing to assert sovereign rights to
use the river, did not attempt to
exercise regulatory authority
beyond the southern side of the
now-resolved boundary. Indeed, as
was done in the case now before the
Court, when Virginia activities
reached from the Virginia shore into
the Maryland portions of the river,
the proponents on the Virginia side
of the river would engage the
Maryland regulatory process as well
as that of Virginia. With the exception of an oystering dispute in
Potomac estuary that arose in 1957
and was resolved by compact in
1958, after 1877, the two states
managed the river cooperatively
until the present dispute.

CASE ANALYSIS
As it was litigated before the Special
Master, this case ultimately was simplified to seeking resolution of three
legal questions: (1) What was the
geographical extent of Virginia's
Potomac access rights declared in
the Compact of 1785 and preserved
in the Black-Jenkins Award of
1877? (2) May Virginia exercise
those access rights free of Maryland
regulation in cases in which the
exercise of the rights is accomplished by construction on the
Virginia shore that extends into the
Maryland portions of the river? (J)
Did Virginia, by acquiescence, sub-

mit to Maryland regulatory authority on a continuing basis?
Owing to the litigation strategies of
the states, the Special Master reconfigured the issues for analysis.
Maryland did not dispute Virginia's
allegation that the activities at issue
in this case-building facilities on
its own shore and making a water
withdrawal from the Potomac-were
among the rights reserved to
Virginia under the 1785 Compact.
What the parties did dispute is
whether that reservation of power
extends to the "entire river" or only
to the portion of the river above the
low-water mark on the Virginia side.
The language of the 1785 Compact
did not clearly answer this question,
so the legal analysis is to sift the
record to properly discern the
intent of the compacting parties
based on inferences from the total
record of all the relevant historical
materials. History buffs may be
entertained, but those with a taste
for pulp fiction will not be. In the
end, the decision, whomever it
favors, will be of little precedential
importance.
Even deciding in favor of Virginia
that its rights include the taking of
water from the entire river does not
answer the second question framed
by the Special Master, the so-called
"regulation issue." Can Maryland
regulate Virginia's right when the
exercise of the right physically
"invades" waters lying on the
Maryland side of the interstate border? Once again, the matter is one
of finding an answer when the primary agreements governing this
relationship are ambiguous.
In addition to historical materials,
the Special Master reviewed at some
length the one previous case that
had addressed these issues,
Maryland 'D. West Virginia, 217 U.S.
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577 (1910), finding that the
Supreme Court had there answered
both the "entire river issue" and the
"regulation issue" favorably to the
Virginia position in this case.
Comparatively speaking, the Special
Master gives short shrift to the
claim of acquiescence, again inquiring as to whether acquiescence can
be found both in relation to the
"entire river issue" and to the "regulation issue." Maryland, as the party seeking to establish acquiescence
as a defense, has the burden of
showing the two elements of the
defense, each by a preponderance of
the evidence. The elements are (1)
long and continuous assertion of
sovereignty by one state and (2)
agreement of the other to submit to
that sovereignty. Here, the Special
Master found the showing was not
made as to either of the two issues.
In part, the Special Master found
the assertion of authority undercut
by the history of the states' agreements that claimed to preserve
Virginia's rights and a near-total
lack of evidence that Virginia agreed
that its rights were no longer going
to be exercised independently.
Also importantly, all other stateacquiescence cases involve disputes
about the boundary location itself
and thus involve the surrender of a
territorial claim, not the surrender
of a sovereign right, which is a far
different proposition.

SIGNIFICANCE
Although the parties may say it
implicates the very core of their
respective sovereignties, this is a
case of limited significance. The
principal limit on the significance of
this case is its rarity. Few states will
share a history of overlapping,
inconsistent royal charters that create so much uncertainty regarding
their sovereign relations.

Issue No.1
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Beyond the history, it is seldom the
case that a state will seek to erect a
facility that is not physically located
entirely within its own borders. At
this point in America's history, dryland state boundaries are well
defined, and a state will build its
faciltty within its own borders and
its own sovereignty. Where water
bodies form the state line, there is
some potential for a project that
reaches across the state line, but
even this situation will seldom
result in controversy. Bridges, for
example, usually are subject to
advance agreement over regulatory
authority, and water projects built
on boundary rivers, in most cases,
do not cross the boundary line. In
this case, however, and in a very
small number of other instances,
the interstate boundary places all
the deeper water on one state's side
of the river. In these few cases, to be
effective, a water intake (or outfall)
would necessarily have to extend
into the portion of the river located
in the neighboring state. In these
few cases, the question will arise
regarding the authority of the
physically "invaded" state to
regulate the project.
Even if the situation were less rare,
claims that common issues of core
sovereignty are at issue in this case
are a bit exaggerated. Federal law
controls most of the important
issues that might arise between the
states. If the dispute is about water
quantity, authoritative interstate
allocations can be made only by
Congress (interstate apportionment), the states and Congress
(interstate compact), or the United
States Supreme Court (equitable
apportionment). If the dispute is
about water quality, the federal
Clean Water Act puts the United
States Environmental Protection
Agency in a position to mediate and
control the activities in one state
that interfere with water quality
laws in another. If the issue is navi-
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gation, the federal navigation servitude applies and the United States
Army Corps of Engineers has jurisdiction. What is left, as in this case,
is more nearly a matter of sovereign
ego that is raised by a remarkable
series of historical events. Maryland,
despite the federal law limits mentioned, wants to regulate this project on the "same" basis as any other that occurs in its waters, and
Virginia does not want to submit its
governmental water projects to the
"say-so" of another state.

ArrORNEYS FOR THE
PARTIES
For the Commonwealth of Virginia
(Frederick S. Fisher (804) 7863870)
For the State of Maryland (Andrew
H. Baida (410) 576-6318)

AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of the Commonwealth
of Virginia
Loudoun County Sanitary
Authority (E. Duncan Getchell
(804) 775-1000)
In Support of the State of
Maryland
Audubon Naturalist Society
(Christopher D. Man (202) 9-!25000)
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